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Impact and Extent of a Mercantile Bankruptcy  
in New Spain:  
the casa de conductas of Pedro de Vértiz in 1802 
1. Introduction 
In past writings I have described the terms under which New Spains 
transportation was made, based on the analysis of the life and work of 
a known transport entrepreneur from the second half of the 17th cen-
tury by the name of Pedro de Vértiz. 
Documental material about Vértiz is abundant because of his sub-
stantial investments in several businesses, and tells us of a significant 
number of operations that he handled as well as his relationship with 
Viceroyal government officials to whom he provided a number of 
services allowing the establishment of contracts and diverse aids 
which are related in many documents of the archive. Due to his elite 
social status, we know more about his personal life through the reali-
zation of several notarial contracts including a will and a power of 
attorney.  
Nevertheless, five months after his demise, Pedro de Vértizs 
transport business suffered a severe bankruptcy that, at first, paralyzed 
New Spains economic activities and triggered terror in the business 
world because, as was often the case, a large number of merchants and 
businessmen were affected and involved. 
The main activity of the casa de conductas was the transportation 
of silver in coins to the ports of Veracruz and Acapulco for shipping 
to Spain and the Philippines, and the shipment of diverse merchandise 
and products, thus the first to be affected were merchants, miners or 
estate owners who managed significant quantities of money. There 
was also the transportation of the Kings silver, which Pedro de 
Vértiz had been doing for many years through the contracts he had 
signed with the Spanish Crown, but to whom he was careful to pay the 
last coin before announcing the bankruptcy of the business. 
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This article will focus exclusively on the casa de conductas bank-
ruptcy, the terms under which it happened, the measures taken by 
Mexico Citys Merchant Consulate to deal with the bankruptcy, as 
well as the impact and extent it had on the mercantile guild and other 
affected groups.  
 
2. Mercantile bankruptcies in Hispanic America 
Mercantile bankruptcies were frequent in the Hispanic American 
world of the 16th, 17th and 18th centuries, though they have been 
scarcely studied by historiography. Even though Antonio-Miguel 
Bernal gives us a synopsis of the mercantile bankruptcies that oc-
curred in the carrera de Indias during this period, his analysis is ex-
clusively based on the archives which refer to bankruptcies in Seville 
and Cadiz (Bernal/García-Baquero González 1976; Bernal Rodríguez 
1992). We also know of bankruptcies suffered by Catalan commerce 
because of the war with England at the end of the 18th century 
(Delgado Ribas 1982: 97-169). Some works analyze particular bank-
ruptcies (Lobato Franco 2005: 203-222; Lorenzo Sanz 1977: 23-50). 
Few studies refer to mercantile bankruptcies happening in America 
during this period, and we know of none that have been made in this 
field for New Spain.  
The analysis of a commercial bankruptcy is useful for the in-depth 
study of mercantile practice, as well as for understanding the multiple 
relationships that are established in the development of businesses and 
companies. Both economical and social associations are exposed al-
lowing us to see both their intensity and extent. 
The resolution of the conflicts that arose during the mercantile 
bankruptcies concerned only the merchant consulates located in sev-
eral places of the Spanish Empire. In New Spain specifically, the re-
sponsibility for knowing about mercantile matters, among them bank-
ruptcies, fell on the prior and consuls from the Mexico City Merchant 
Consulate.1 In order to relieve them of heavy burdens and accelerate 
the resolution of conflicts, the legislation contemplated the naming of 
one, two or more members of the consulate, who were instructed in 
                                                     
1  Recopilación de leyes de los Reinos de Indias, título 46 de los consulados de 
Lima y México, Ley xxviij. In: <http://www.congreso.gob.pe/ntley/ 
LeyIndiaP.htm> (2010, Feb. 28). 
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the particular case, to whom the paperwork and accounts of the busi-
nesses were to be handed, and whose obligation was to give the prior 
and consuls their written opinion.2 
It was under these terms that the bankruptcy of Pedro de Vértizs 
casa de conductas occurred. One cannot help noticing the diligence of 
the consulate to respect this resolution over which he had exclusive 
jurisdiction. From the first meetings, which tried to establish an 
agreement between the parties, the members of the consulate wanted 
to prevent the participation of the judge Ciriaco [González] Carvajal 
who, commissioned by the Viceroy, intended to give a fair ruling on 
the conflict. 
Before following the course of the bankruptcy, we will describe 
New Spains context in 1802 as well as the particular setbacks that 
Vértiz had suffered in his business during previous years. 
 
3. New Spain in 1802: risks and uncertainties 
During the last years of the 18th century, particularly since 1796, the 
situation of Spain and its colonies had become very difficult. Spain 
declared war on England during that year which led to a naval block-
ade preventing transit between Spain and America. Eventually this led 
to the destruction of the Spanish imperial commercial system (Fisher 
1992: 242). Imports and exports from American ports, among them 
Veracruz, fell drastically, forcing merchants in America to exert pres-
sure to allow neutral commerce. Although authorized by the Spanish 
Crown, the royal order was soon retracted because of pressure from 
Spanish consulates and because, in fact, a lot of merchandise arrived 
in America, not only from North America but from England as well 
(Fisher 1992: 243). In order to grasp the difficulty of the situation it 
must be mentioned that in 1799 twenty-two ships left Spain, but only 
three made it to America. Finally in 1801, in order to solve the prob-
lem, the Crown granted special licenses to merchants from several 
nationalities to supply America from neutral ports (Fisher 1992: 244). 
In the last months of 1801, peace preparations began, and in March 
1802, when the English along with the French and Spanish signed the 
                                                     
2  Recopilación de leyes de los Reinos de Indias, título 46 de los consulados 
de   Lima y México, Ley xxxxj. In: <http://www.congreso.gob.pe/ntley/ 
LeyIndiaP.htm> (2010, Feb. 28). 
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Treaty of Amiens, commerce in the carrera de Indias began to re-
cover very slowly, though with great alterations. 
During August 1801, Viceroy Marquina from New Spain wrote to 
Spains Hacienda: [...] about the medium adopted by the royal capital 
of letters to take to this peninsula the royal valuables detained in 
America because of the war [...].3 
This situation surely affected the business of Pedro de Vértiz di-
rectly since, being responsible for the transportation of royal freight to 
the ports of Veracruz and Acapulco, and of a variety of merchandise 
including silver from private businesses, it saw a decrease in the 
shipment of coins and in the entrance of products such as mercury, 
paper, steel, etc. We can infer that with less cargo shipments, he had 
less income, which would have seriously affected the business. But we 
think that what accelerated the bankruptcy of the casa de conductas 
more than anything else was the continuation of commercial activities 
following the signing of the Amiens Treaty, and the appearance of the 
simultaneous requirements both of the Royal Hacienda as well as pri-
vate bailees to send their money to the port of Veracruz for later 
remittance to Spain. Such was the demand for deliveries from the 
transport house to the port and posterior shipment to Spain that Oteiza, 
Vértizs cousin who remained in charge of the business, was over-
loaded and there was no longer enough money deposited in his store 
to cover all the expenses. 
In addition, in New Spains internal context in 1802, the yellow 
fever reigned with extraordinary violence from April to October, 
causing the death of many in the port of Veracruz. As mentioned ear-
lier, during that year mercury was also scarce, so work in the mines 
was slow. Furthermore, the bankruptcy of the casa de conductas not 
only obstructed commerce for some months, but also damaged clients 
confidence.4  
Other issues that must be described were pointed out by Pedro de 
Vértiz himself a few years before his death, in February 1802. In this 
case the phenomena mentioned by Vértiz were related to New Spain. 
We know that in 1762 the seat of the royal cargoes to the ports of Ve-
racruz and Acapulco and a hundred leagues around was auctioned and 
                                                     
3  Letter, México, August 1801, AGI, Estado 29, n. 33. 
4  Balanza del comercio de Veracruz correspondiente a 1802, AGI, Méx. 2996. 
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won by Pedro de Vértiz.5 The contract, which was meant to last five 
years, was renewed for lack of another contender, and because the 
Viceroys pleaded with him to continue, thus, in 1802 he was still en-
trepreneur to the Crown. 
On several occasions Vértiz expressed his reluctance to continue 
with the contract, because it meant huge economic losses. In 1781 he 
wrote to Viceroy Mayorga about the contingent situation that New 
Spain was experiencing due to the war between the United States and 
England and the Spanish intervention, in addition to the droughts and 
epidemics being suffered in the territory.6 Before that, both the Vice-
roy Marquis de Croix and the Viceroy Bucareli had requested him to 
remain in charge of shipping the royal cargo. Consequently, Vértiz did 
not retire believing it to be inappropriate for him to discontinue his 
duties to the King. In 1791 he again manifested his nonconformity that 
the conditions of his contract were not respected, given that he was 
not assigned the volume of better paid shipments that would compen-
sate the losses incurred from the silver shipments, for which he was 
paid very little. The situation of Vértizs business became unbearable, 
and in 1796 he wrote again, this time to Viceroy Marquis of Branci-
forte; in his statements he alluded to, among other causes, the great 
death toll of mules he had suffered: of the twenty something he started 
with, only eight remained at that time.7 The extreme droughts that 
New Spain had suffered meant less pasture and no water in the drink-
ing troughs and along with that, the death of many pack mules on the 
roads because they were unable to withstand the traveling conditions. 
Also, because of the excessive demand for these beasts, their price had 
risen too much. This meant Vértiz did not make any profit by trans-
porting the royal shipments of freight at the low fixed prices estab-
lished in his contract. The cost of living had gone sky high and the 
upkeep of the muleteers, as well as the animals themselves, had been 
rising. Cargo animals were impounded constantly because of the wars 
Spain was involved in during that time, to be used as a means of 
transportation for the troops and their luggage, as well as for sending 
the necessary provisions for them and the crews of the ships that were 
                                                     
5  AGI, Méx. 1575, f. 1v.  
6  AGI, Méx. 1575, f. 2.  
7  AGI, Méx. 1575, ff. 3-4. 
Clara Elena Suárez Argüello 274
on war alert. Vértiz asked to be completely exempted from the trans-
portation of royal shipments, mentioning that he had been a carrier of 
these for more than thirty years, shipping one hundred and ninety-four 
million pesos in coins, which resulted in a considerable saving for 
New Spains Royal Hacienda.8 He also mentioned that, because of the 
mule driving system used in New Spain, it was necessary to re-equip 
the muleteers giving them money in advance so they could fulfill their 
contract completely; this implied severe monetary losses, as some of 
these muleteers died, did not pay or their businesses went bankrupt, so 
they owed significant amounts of money.9  
Authorities were aware of this issue, and in the report prepared by 
the accountant Lasso, Treasurer-General of the Army and Royal Haci-
enda in New Spain, he pointed out:10 
Neither justice nor equity suffer that a subject of such a relevant merit as 
Vértiz be a victim with all his family of an honorable service, nor the 
King nor Your Excellency can allow it when for so many reasons his 
house is worthy of awards; and in such a conflict we judge it should be 
premeditated the best way to avoid the risks he fears. There is a lot in 
giving an opinion which sounds costly to the treasury, he being in the 
ability for the royal shipments to be shipped at a low price; but after all, 
it is essential and at the end it shall be taken or after the ruin of the casa 
de Vértiz or before as it is fairer. This is why we believe that while the 
seat is proclaimed and auctioned, it is convenient that Pedro de Vértiz 
continues in the loyalty [...]. 
This description not only illustrates the abuse of New Spains authori-
ties in order to favor the interests of the metropolis (although there is 
clear awareness of the contingent situations that had been experienced 
in New Spain), but also shows that despite that fact and the grave 
threat of bankruptcy that hung over Pedro de Vértizs business, the 
priority was to save the Crowns money at the expense of others and 
avoid any expenditure. 
In other essays related to the casa de conductas of Pedro de Vér-
tiz, we have mentioned the role played by his relative, Juan José de 
Oteiza y Vértiz, and the way he took care of the business at the end of 
Pedro de Vértizs life (Suárez Argüello 2004; 2007). The reader must 
                                                     
8  AGI, Méx. 1575, f. 8.  
9  AGI, Méx. 1575, f. 8v 
10  AGI, Méx. 1575, ff. 20-20v. 
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then draw his own conclusions as to who and what were the causes 
that took the business to bankruptcy. 
 
4. The bankruptcy terms and the consulates intervention 
Pedro de Vértiz died on February 22, 1802, and Oteiza declared the 
bankruptcy of the casa de conductas on July 14 of that same year. We 
must take into account that this business worked both for the Spanish 
Crown and for private clients. Nevertheless, the Kings interests were 
protected, because Oteiza, before declaring bankruptcy, was shrewd 
enough to settle all business with the royal treasury. He even asked for 
a loan of twenty-five thousand pesos from Don Joaquín Aldana, so he 
could settle any pending matters. Oteiza considered that if the Crown 
was involved in the bankruptcy, the lawsuit would have gone to other 
tribunals and the private creditors would lose priority.11  
With Oteizas declaration that the casa de conductas was in bank-
ruptcy, the Consulates Tribunal designated three trustees: the mer-
chant lawyers Alva, Guardamino and Durana, who were charged with 
going to the business to recover all the paperwork and accounts, of 
which both Oteiza and the people who depended on him had denied 
the existence. Knowing that, the Consulates Tribunal sent six notaries 
to take declarations from several employees, one of whom attested to 
the existence of books and paperwork. 
On August 21st, the Tribunal summoned all the affected parties 
who denounced Oteiza and his dependents for the denial of the docu-
ments. Two executive ministers, two commerce representatives and 
two scribes went to the warehouse and collected twenty-six books and 
seized the correspondence. 
The meeting, attended by more than eighty affected people, plus 
the Tribunal members, was heated, and only calmed down when the 
judges imposed their authority and asked Oteiza to leave. The trustee 
Alva mentioned that the books should be revised with the utmost care, 
so they could determine if the bankruptcy had been declared in good 
or bad faith, and requested an inventory of all of Vértizs and Oteizas 
assets. He suggested appointing a group of individuals that would 
examine the documents and draw up the inventories, assisted by two 
                                                     
11  AGN, Cons. 207, exp. 3, ff. 60v, 97v. 
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trustworthy notaries. Alva mentioned that the people who were af-
fected were not only from Mexico City, but from all over the realm, 
some even from Europe, so it was indispensable for the Tribunal to be 
scrupulous, because this a was a bankruptcy of the greatest considera-
tion and would surely cause many lawsuits and much confusion. In the 
meantime, the affected people were asked not to submit claims until 
the situation was clear, and a public decree was circulated both in the 
realm and in Europe. It was also decided to inform the King so he 
could make the necessary provisions to prevent the lawsuits that 
would arise because of the bankruptcy. Alva was elected as receiver of 
the economic board, and all the people who were affected were sum-
moned to a new meeting on August 23, 1802.12 The meeting was 
postponed at the Viceroys request until the 26th so he could attend 
personally. At that meeting all the affected parties received an official 
letter informing them that the Viceroy would be unable to attend and 
that the judge Don Ciriaco Carvajal would represent him.  
At that, the most recent consul, Chavarri, informed the Viceroy 
that the Tribunal could not and should not be presided over by a min-
ister from the Royal Audience, because its natural judge and president 
was the Consulates Prior. But Judge Carvajal was present neverthe-
less, and all the members of the Tribunal left. Even so, the meeting 
went ahead because a good number of the creditors were present in-
cluding Antonio de Bassoco, a renowned merchant, and the Superin-
tendent of the Royal Mint. 
Oteiza was asked a number of questions about the unpaid sum, the 
funds he had access to, the value of his estates and the interests with 
which they were taxed. Oteiza answered with a negative to all these 
questions. Nevertheless, when he was asked since when the casa had 
gone into decline, he answered: 
The only thing that can be said is that when Vértiz died the casa had a lot 
of money; that when peace came, he started to give the creditors what 
they asked for, and that he found a void without sense, which made it 
impossible for him to keep order in the shipments under the terms he had 
before: and so he dealt with the first ones and the ones that followed, un-
til it was impossible to cover the sums he had to remit.13  
                                                     
12  AGN, Cons. 287, exp. 4, n.d. 
13  AGN, Cons. 287, exp. 4, n.d. 
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The participants at the meeting then requested him to submit the ac-
counts in good order without delay, with the help of the trustee Pas-
cual de Alva, so they could understand what they were talking about, 
but Oteiza excused himself saying he had no head for that, and that it 
would take him several months. The merchant Yturbe e Yraeta inter-
vened pointing out that no excuse was valid and that if necessary, he 
must work day and night until the real state of the bankruptcy was 
known, at which the participants murmured approval for a good while. 
The sons of Vértiz, brothers-in-law of Oteiza, also attended, and 
asked that the meeting bear in mind the inheritance due to them from 
their late mother, mentioning that the amount in question (the hijue-
las14) was more than 300,000 pesos, and should not be affected by the 
proceedings. 
In the end, it was agreed that the examination of the accounts 
should continue, and that the Consulate should protest the intervention 
of the Viceroy or his representative before the King in the knowledge 
of these matters, which did not come under their authority.15  
A new meeting was summoned for August 31, at which the judge 
Ciriaco Carvajal was present again. The trustee Alva showed the at-
tendees a statement he had obtained, based on the books and docu-
ments which had been given to him, mentioning that the default 
reached 900,000 pesos. Oteiza himself presented a statement of the 
situation, in which he said that the total owed by title deeds, deposits 
in trust and bills of shipment reached 2,248,950 pesos, that the total 
value of the properties and dependencies was of 1,890,035 pesos, so 
the default ascended to 358,314 pesos.16 This entire situation sparked 
a huge argument and several alternative solutions were proposed. 
Yturbe suggested the impounding of all of Oteizas assets, which were 
to be handed over to several individuals so they could be managed or 
sold to recover part of the debt. Alva said that they should not count 
on Oteizas assets because all of the properties were taxed on more 
than their value, and that the best alternative was to let the casa de 
conductas continue its main business activity, to see if the debt could 
be settled that way. Because the family of Vértiz and Oteiza had inter-
                                                     
14  Hijuelas are the goods that belong to each of the recipients from a division of an 
inheritance. 
15  AGN, Cons. 287, exp. 4, n.d. 
16  Lucas Alamán Papers, CEHM-CARSO, CCLXXXVII, C Folder, file 140.  
Clara Elena Suárez Argüello 278
ests and friendships in Durango, a list of the people from there was 
presented, and they offered to pay the debt of the business as long as 
they were given enough mercury to be able to work and make the 
payment, since there was no mercury in New Spain due to the war. 
Rafael de Vértiz, oldest son of Pedro de Vértiz and rector of the 
University, was also present and said that if the casa de conductas 
continued, he would convince his brothers to mortgage their properties 
and cover the debts of the business. In so doing, plus some other guar-
antors that Oteiza would find, the acquired debt could be secured, and 
the casa de conductas could continue to offer its services, thus it was 
expected that the bankruptcy could be repaid over time. Judge Carva-
jal for his part, proposed to extend the time frame and accept the offer 
from the people of Durango to act as guarantors, promising that both 
the Viceroy and Oteiza would find them enough mercury to extract 
silver from their mines. The Veracruz Consulate and the huge group 
of affected members, proposed that in agreement with the laws, the 
bills of lading issued by the casa de conductas should go back to their 
origin, so they could finally be paid. The meeting ended without any 
firm resolution, and amidst anger from the creditors they agreed to 
meet again the following week.17  
On September 6 the fourth meeting took place, presided over 
again by Judge Carvajal. Oteiza once more presented a statement of 
what the businesses owned and the debts they had, and asked that he 
be given three years, in which time he would pay 60%, thereby pro-
tecting the interests of Vértizs children. But, despite the claims made 
by them in the previous meeting about their mothers inheritance, it 
appears that they had already received larger amounts than what was 
due to them. The board of creditors then addressed the judge thanking 
him for his good service, but at the same time asking him to step down 
and allow the Consulates Tribunal to act. Despite Carvajals pleas to 
take matters calmly, he was not allowed to stay; he withdrew to in-
form the Viceroy, and the members of the Tribunal immediately as-
sumed activities.  
The trustee Alva spoke first retracting what was said in the previ-
ous meeting about the casa de conductas continuing business as usual, 
and pointing out that by what was observed up until then, Oteiza had 
                                                     
17  AGN, Cons. 287, exp. 4, n.d. 
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shown himself to be of reprehensible bad faith. He accused him of 
having recently received eight hundred thousand pesos, which he 
found entered in the bills of lading books, but that the money was not 
in Veracruz or elsewhere, and Oteiza would not mention its where-
abouts. He was of the opinion that Oteiza should be imprisoned until 
he confessed where the money was, and agreed with the creditors on 
the impoundment of all his assets, commissioning several people as 
members of the economic board of the bankruptcy, to be responsible 
for the requisitions as well as taking care that all businesses and prop-
erties of Vértiz and Oteiza continued to work normally, and that any 
profits would be taken as settlement until the properties were sold and 
creditors could be paid with the proceeds. The money was to be han-
dled by Don Antonio de Bassoco, at that time the consulates treas-
urer. 
The tribunal detained Oteiza for interrogation, which he refused 
without the presence of his lawyer, whereupon he was sent to the 
royal court prison. He was denied any kind of communication because 
of the evident concealment, dilapidation and bad faith he showed.18 
 
5. Acting of the economic board and handling of the bankruptcy 
The members of the economic board of the bankruptcy were Pascual 
de Alva, who at first had been named trustee, Gabriel de Yturbe e 
Yraeta, Don Roque Valiente, Don Tomás Ramón de Ybarrola, Don 
Mateo de Palacio and Don Manuel Antonio de Basail, all merchants. 
The first agreement was to confiscate all assets from the house of 
Vértiz, and for members of the board to go to the estates to report on 
what each produced, which should remain in operation and which 
should be sold. 
They also decided to publish a notice for anyone who knew about 
other properties or monies to come forward, and offered 10% to any-
one who would mention which persons had taken coins from the casa 
de conductas in the days before the bankruptcy. Finally, the debtors of 
Vértiz and Oteiza were warned to declare the monies they owed in 
two months at the most. Failure to comply would result in them pay-
                                                     
18  Lucas Alamán Papers, CEHM-CARSO, CCLXXXVII, C Folder, file 140. 
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ing twice as much; the creditors were also expected to appear or name 
a representative within the same period.19 
Posters and signs were distributed announcing the bankruptcy. It 
was even published in the Mexico Gazette, where the 10% reward for 
information on Oteizas alleged hiding of the money was offered. 
Some time afterwards, Don Antonio Del Cristo was named as rep-
resentative to oversee the many interests in Veracruz along with the 
intervention of the newly-created consulate. Cristo, also a merchant, 
had been affected by the bankruptcy, and his nomination was rejected 
by the king and Don Francisco Maniau y Torquemada was elected 
instead. 
In defense of Oteiza, Manuel Felipe de Fagoaga y Vértiz, his 
brother-in-law as well as representative, executor, etc., argued against 
the way the economic board had acted through the years, causing se-
vere damage to his defendant. For example, at the Belén Mill, located 
in the Valley of Mexico, which belonged to Juan José de Oteiza, se-
vere violations were suffered, even though it was held in the highest 
regard before it was seized. Fagoaga also mentioned the offenses that 
Oteiza had suffered, which were completely inadmissible because he 
was of noble birth and because he was not guilty. 
He argued that the members of the economic board had hired a 
crowd of dependents and unexperienced administrators to handle the 
matter, with extremely high salaries who were to be paid from the 
bankruptcy estate itself; they had made hasty sales, auctions without 
the participation of the consuls, which was considered an illegal pro-
cedure. The most significant thing was that the economic board was 
comprised of two judges who were brothers-in-law of the main credi-
tors, so no one could speak of their impartiality, because according to 
his representative cousin: parentage binds them to blood sympa-
thies.20 
Fagoaga appealed to the Consulates Tribunal on several occa-
sions, mentioning Oteizas innocence and complaining about the se-
vere humiliations his cousin had suffered and that the members of the 
economic board wanted to expand and perpetuate their cause forever 
and ever. The members of the board had a thousand excuses not to 
                                                     
19  Lucas Alamán Papers, CEHM-CARSO, CCLXXXVII, C Folder, file 140. 
20  AGN, Cons. 207, exp. 3, f. 88v.  
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free Oteiza, despite the appeal for his release and the stroke he suf-
fered while in prison. Fagoaga also went to the Alzadas court, and its 
members where the judge Don Manuel de la Bodega and his assistants 
Don Vicente Francisco Vidal and Don Gabriel de Yermo ordered and 
sent the respective bail to liberate Don Juan José de Oteiza. The mem-
bers of the economic board on behalf of the claimants, objected to this 
order,21 because they considered that until the lawsuits committments 
and arrangements were settled with the creditors, that is, until there 
was no matter outstanding, Oteiza must not be freed.22 
At the beginning of 1804, the members of the economic board 
agreed that a proclamation be released for the auction of some proper-
ties such as the store and a tendajón23 in the city of Durango with their 
respective attached dependencies, as well as several estates that Vértiz 
had in that jurisdiction.24 During the last months of 1805, Francisco 
Chavarri and Sebastián de Heras Soto, ex consuls of the Consulate, 
and judges of the bankruptcy, announced in the Diario de México25 
that creditors who had not collected the fourth part corresponding to 
the debt that they should do so, in order for members of the economic 
board to pay them as the rest of the properties were auctioned. They 
thought that in this way they would avoid the bankruptcies which 
menaced several of the creditors, as well as paying the corresponding 
interests.26 
In the midst of all this, and due to his stroke, Oteiza died, and the 
consolidation of the Royal Vouchers began in New Spain, where the 
assets of Vértiz and Oteiza were affected. The economic board was, 
therefore, forbidden to dispose of the valuables of the proceedings 
until they received approval from a higher authority. In addition, the 
members of the board thought it pernicious to agree to the arrange-
ment which allowed the consolidation (that is, payment in install-
ments), and preferred to pay everything in one payment to avoid 
greater problems for the debtors and the accounting becoming more 
complicated. In May 1807, the members of the economic board 
                                                     
21  AGN, Cons. 207, exp. 3, ff. 98-109.  
22  AGN, Cons. 207, exp. 3, 140 ff. 
23  Tendajón is a small store with a small capital and therefore few goods.  
24  Gaceta de México, February 18 1804, 12, 5, p. 44. 
25  Diario de México, November 23 1805, 1, 54, p. 228. 
26  AGN, Cons. 287, exp. 26, 72 ff.  
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handed over 94,946 pesos 6 reales in cash to the consolidation branch 
for assets in the jurisdiction of Mexico City and which included thirty-
nine receipts for chaplaincies, bail money, etc. given by Vértiz and 
Oteiza; and 25,686 pesos corresponding to the Durango properties. 
They asked the Viceroy to lift the ban on the disposal of the valu-
ables.27 
In the same year of 1807, at the Kings request, the proceedings 
were also charged with the part corresponding to the difference in 
shipping when the contract was not finished because of the bank-
ruptcy, returning 810 pesos 4 reales in cash to the Royal Estate.28  
At the beginning of 1811, after the independence movement be-
gan, and at the request of the consulate, the members of the economic 
board submitted a statement of the bankruptcy proceedings of Don 
Pedro de Vértiz and Don Juan José de Oteiza, resulting in a volumi-
nous and confusing file. 
If to todays reader the document Statement of the bankruptcy 
proceedings of Don Pedro de Vértiz and Don Juan José de Oteiza, 
composed of the pieces numbered 1 to 26 formed by the economic 
board29 is difficult to understand and very obscure, a contemporary of 
the time, the Marquis of Santa Cruz de Inguanzo, when asked to give 
his opinion on the situation of the bankruptcy proceedings of Vértix 
and Oteiza, stated that:30 
certainly such commission or charge would be quickly vacated by simply 
ratifying or proving that entries that he considered composed the charge 
and the data, and more so by examining one document or another; but I 
cannot express to Your Lordship my amazement on noticing that the 
more I learned from the accounts book, and the plan presented with the 
cited books, you can say that almost in every entry that comprises it, I 
found an incumbrance; and in an attempt to avoid them I requested sev-
eral books and notebooks from the office of this royal tribunal and some 
others from the actual trustee, Don Manuel Basail, but could make no 
progress, except the disappointment that it is impossible or extremely dif-
ficult to form a judgment over such accounting [...]. 
                                                     
27  AGN, Tierras. 3617, exp. 1, ff. 40-58. 
28  AGN, RCO 198, exp. 159, ff. 233-236. 
29  AGN, Tierras. 3617, exp. 1, ff. 16-80. See my previous article (Suárez Argüello 
2007) for what Stanley Stein says about it. I have been unable to understand the 
terms in which this accounting was done, but I have to recognize that despite 
that, these documents have contributed valuable elements to the study. 
30  AGN, Tierras. 3617, exp. 1, fs. 92 y ss. 
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Not only that, at the end of 1812, when the Marquis of Santa Cruz de 
Inguanzo gave his report to the consulates tribunal, he pointed out 
that although the economic board had been comprised of seven indi-
viduals, at that time only four remained because the lawyer, Don Pas-
cual de Alva, had ceased to continue on the board, and his later death, 
along with that of Don Matías Gutiérrez de Lanzas, and in July 1811, 
the death of Colonel Gabriel de Yturbe e Yraeta, prevented the board 
from operating because it did not reach a quorum. Even so, the Mar-
quis of Santa Cruz de Inguanzo felt it appropriate for a model to be 
used for the preparation of the bankruptcy statement, and that it was 
necessary to ask Basail, who as secretary had delivered the accounts, 
to redo them on that basis, giving him a month at the most to complete 
the task.31 He also criticized the burdensome expenses incurred by the 
economic board on hiring a numerous staff composed of a commis-
sioner, secretary, lawyer, dependents, bailee and business agent, as 
well as a place to work, the sum of which ascended to 14,000 pesos a 
year, and he recommended trying to recuperate the premises which 
could be recovered in order to make another payment to the unhappy 
creditors. Of course, even though Basail had the help of a new com-
missioner paid by the proceedings to do the unfinished accounting, 
and which was said to be more than 600,000 pesos, it seems it was 
never actually delivered.32 
Even in 1814 the consulate afforded himself the luxury of borrow-
ing almost 6,000 pesos from the proceedings towards the countrys 
peace efforts promising to repay the amount shortly. In 1815 the credi-
tors were summoned once again to be informed of the business and 
debt collection situations. The meeting was attended by 46 affected 
people.33 
In truth, the conflict dragged on for many years, even when the 
consulate, as a merchants institution, had been suppressed. 
More news was reported in 1829, when before a public notary, the 
commercial company of Agüero and González was in possession of a 
title deed for $130,000 from an assignment in 1813 by the graduate 
commissioners José Monter and Antonio Batres, who at that time 
                                                     
31  AGN, Tierras. 3617, exp. 1, ff. 109-110. 
32  AGN, Tierras. 3617, exp. 1, ff. 92-93 y ss.  
33  AGN, Tierras. 3617, exp. 1, ff. 109-114.  
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were accounting minister and treasurer of the army and internal reve-
nue and named members of the minor board and trustees of the Vértiz 
y Oteiza proceedings. The transfer of said deed meant that the amount 
mentioned and the overdue and future income were to be paid to these 
gentlemen. Thus, Agüero González and Co. in 1829 decided to pay 
$82,150 pesos to Mr. Eduardo F. Wilson, keeping the sum of $47,850 
pesos for themselves.34 
Certainly the people who were involved in the bankruptcy of the 
casa de conductas recovered the bare minimum of what they had 
originally deposited. 
 
6. The network of Pedro de Vértiz and Juan José de Oteiza;  
its graphic representation 
In order to draw the network of Pedro de Vértiz I have filled in a chart 
with all the information arising from the bankruptcy, which allows us 
to observe a dense net of several hundred individuals who were af-
fected by it. Of course, many more people were involved, although 
their connection was not direct, but through an intermediary. 
An analysis of the chart allows us to observe the diverse links es-
tablished by these two individuals of Navarre origin, who lived in 
New Spain during the second half of the 18th century, and who were 
outstanding both socially and economically, having a vast capital con-
sisting of diverse properties, liquid assets, and businesses in the trans-
port and flour industries, all of which ensured an effective economic 
income, and countless associations. 
A first analysis shows us that to accomplish this spectacular eco-
nomic and social rise, family and societal ties were fundamental. 
Without them, reaching this status would have been far more difficult 
and probably less remarkable. The immigrants found themselves an 
economic and social niche on arrival in their new country which im-
mediately put them on track to attaining their goals. 
From the same or neighboring towns, they arrived in New Spain to 
live with an uncle or a cousin who had already settled with his family, 
thus avoiding much of the cultural upheaval of immigration. Eventu-
ally they would marry a cousin or niece, thereby completely integrat-
                                                     
34  AGNCM, FA, notario n. 715, Ramón Villalobos, 4823, ff. 66-68v.  
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ing into the family. They became the right hand of their father-in-law, 
and although they began working at the lowest level, they soon got to 
know the business. Over time, they took over one business after an-
other and began some of their own enterprises, increasing the family 
fortune. As time went by, the sons-in-law took charge of all the busi-
nesses, inheriting and managing them in the name of their wives. They 
formed families of their own, planning the entire lives of their children 
by placing them strategically in diverse social positions such as the 
clergy, or arranging suitable marriages in order to continue the line 
established in the 16th century, much of which continues today. Thus, 
Pedro de Vértiz arrived at his uncles house, who was also in the ship-
ping business, among others, and a property owner, and married his 
oldest daughter. The pattern repeated itself with Juan José de Oteiza y 
Vértiz, first cousin to Pedro de Vértiz, who also married his uncles 
oldest daughter; they lived in the same family house and were the 
indispensable support of Pedro de Vértiz throughout his lifetime. 
Societal ties were fundamental in setting up a business because 
they ensured honesty and trust. Oteiza, therefore, began work in the 
shop established by Pedro de Vértiz in Durango, as did several of their 
countrymen. 
The nuclear families of Vértiz and Oteiza played a fundamental 
role, and both were profoundly affected by the bankruptcy. The late 
Vértiz had had ten children, only eight of whom survived, one being 
rector of the university. Oteiza, married to Vértizs eldest daughter, 
had three children, who were still young when he died. The problem 
began with the inheritance which belonged to Vértizs children from 
their mothers side, and from which they were largely dispossessed, 
because several of them had already been given a greater proportion. 
On the other hand, furniture and jewels from their fathers house were 
auctioned, in an excessive attempt by the economic board to liquidate 
all assets and belongings. 
There is no doubt that both Vértiz and Oteiza generated documen-
tation for the diverse merchant operations they carried out; neverthe-
less, the bankruptcy produced an immense quantity of files which 
have served as a window through which we can observe the extensive 
and multiple relationships both of them had throughout their produc-
tive lifetime. These papers even allow us to classify the kind of rela-
tionships they had and which were more intense. 
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In conclusion, we can illustrate the kind of relationship established 
through this analysis. One was somewhat impersonal, although there 
is no doubt that trust must have prevailed, since these were individuals 
who deposited money for transporting to Veracruz or Acapulco and 
later shipping to Spain or the Philippines, with no more than a piece of 
paper called a bill of lading. Nevertheless, their number reached 
almost 400 in the months before the bankruptcy: as Fagoaga, Oteizas 
brother-in-law defender, pointed out, the casa de conductas trans-
ferred around twenty million pesos a year.35 These clients came not 
only from Mexico City, but also from the rest of New Spain, such as 
Nueva Galicia and Nueva Vizcaya. They were mainly merchants or 
miners who sent deposits to Spain, both to family or to refurbish tools 
or raw materials. 
Another kind of relationship arose from the money deposits made 
in the house of Vértiz. We may not know how much money was de-
posited, for which an interest was surely paid, nor how many people 
were involved, but they must have had absolute trust in the business to 
leave the fruits of all their efforts and their future security in its hands.  
In both kinds of relationships trust came more from the interested 
party, while in other kinds of relationships which also appear in our 
chart, such as those of dependents or subordinate employees, trust 
must have existed both ways, because the fact that properties and in-
terests were taken care of must have been fundamental. In these cases, 
another kind of association could appear, such as affection, as in the 
case of countrymen or family, which implied a mutually intense rela-
tionship. Such is the case of the Durango group, which owed Oteiza a 
significant amount. The group offered to pay immediately to get him 
out of trouble, but they defaulted nevertheless, even though the Vice-
roy had obtained the mercury for them to be able to continue with 
their mining operations. In the case of business owners such as May-
ora, a baker, or Urroz, a farmer in charge of one of the Temascaltepec 
estates, both took advantage of the circumstances, declaring against 
Oteiza and trying to keep the business or part of it. Thus we can ob-
serve that the social network is a process integrated by different kinds 
of relationships and not only undergoes constant change, but also il-
lustrates only certain moments of reality. 
                                                     
35  AGN, Cons. 297, exp. 3, f. 87v.  
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Finally, it can be said that an event like bankruptcy has a signifi-
cant social impact, which causes the network to be modified, new 
interests to appear and new social groups to be created.  
 
Translated from Spanish to English by Ana Perusquía 
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